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Abstract
India is in the middle of the biggest expansion of nuclear power in its history, adding
20 GWe in the next 14 years in the form of pressure water reactors and fast breeder
reactors. At the same time, the United States is overturning decades of policy in order
to resume the export of nuclear materials to India, opening up the possibility of private
investors in the Indian nuclear industry for the first time. This is a period of progress
and turmoil in India's nuclear power program. This thesis seeks to describe and
analyze India's nuclear prospects and to qualitatively assess the system's strengths
and weaknesses. Using the inception of the country's nuclear power program as a
starting point, this thesis will trace India's nuclear lineage to the present. In the
process, it will evaluate what makes the Indian program unique, and why it may not
be ideal for India that the United States is finally renewing its offers of a cooperative
nuclear alliance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
India's nuclear power program significantly outperformed the United States nuclear
industry over the last decade and a half. In addition to putting ten new commercial
reactors into service since 1990, with just one minor accident, nearly every one of
these nuclear projects was completed ahead of schedule.
In many ways India has the perfect regulatory structure for such an enterprise. A
vertical industry, the nuclear power program is entirely controlled by the Government
of India. Although there are decided disadvantages to a command economy, it seems
to have been ideal for nuclear power in India. It has allowed the administration to
disregard the competitive concerns, to determine what was best for the country, and
to dictate the course of the program.
It is easy to imagine a culture in which this system would fail utterly - the
Soviet Union is an obvious example. But in the technocratic meritocracy of India's
nuclear community, where the regulatory agencies are administered by scientists and
engineers, this system has fostered and encouraged a healthy, strong nuclear industry.
This makes the United States's recent alliance with India slightly troubling; with
the new influx of private investment and competition, the technology focus of the
administration may wane. Although it is certainly in India's advantage to be receiv-
ing exports from the United States once again, after a 26 year moratorium, it does
pose a danger to India's nuclear program. Nuclear energy has yet to become truly
competitive, and turning nuclear power into a commercialized, competitive industry
will eliminate the one advantage India has.
On the other hand, it is possible that India has been sacrificing safety to progress
and efficiency. Although the details are difficult to verify, because of the tight-lipped
nature of the nuclear power community, there have been reports that the centralized
nature of the Indian nuclear power program have resulted in errors, because of pres-
sure to approve the project. Although the vertical, centralized structure is ideal for
rapid growth, it is dangerous in terms of safety.
This is another reason to follow the progress of India's nuclear industry. As the
world gets smaller, what happens on the other side of the world can directly affect
public policy in the United States. Modern reactors in operation today are estimated
to have a core-damage event probability of 1 in 10,000 reactor-years. With a pro-
jected capacity of 1000 GWe for 2050, this is predicted to result in four core accidents
globally. [1] Yet just one accident may be too many. The Chernobyl disaster nearly put
an end to American nuclear power production, despite its location on another conti-
nent. A similar accident in India could continue the US nuclear industry's stagnation
for another few decades.
Additionally, with the advent of international terrorism, what occurs in India can
have a direct impact on the security of the United States. Problems in the regulatory
structure, weaknesses in the non-proliferation defenses, or corruption in the system
could all lead to domestic crises. Although it seems unlikely that India would be the
source of such a problem, not being especially prone to corruption or incompetence, it
is important for the United States to be vigilant with respect to all nuclear countries.
Whether it be as a model of success or a weak link, India will serve as an essential
case study in the growth of a nuclear industry. This thesis will provide a detailed
description of the Indian nuclear power program, its strengths and its weaknesses,
and will provide evidence for the conclusions articulated in this chapter.
Chapter 2
India's Need for Nuclear Energy
In July 2005, before a joint session of the US Congress, Indian Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh articulated his desire to eliminate poverty and foster democracy
through economic success. He stated that his country would continue to encourage
enterprise and trade "so that Indian talent and enterprise can realize its full potential,
enabling India to participate in the global economy as an equal partner." [2] India is
looking to raise itself by its bootstraps, to the status of a developed nation.
In order to achieve this goal, India needs to continue its economic growth and
ratchet up its electricity production. Although India has established itself as an
undeniable presence in the global community, its per capita GDP remains low, ranking
136th worldwide. It has one of the world's top technological communities, yet nearly
half of its population still lives without electricity, a demographic larger than the
entire population of the United States.
2.1 Electricity Demands
Electricity has proven to be the deciding factor in economic progress for more than
100 years. The industrial revolution guaranteed that a plentiful, reliable source of
electricity is a prerequisite to competing in the international market.
With 1.1. billion people, India is the world's second largest country by population,
grow by roughly 1.4% per year, and is expected to surpass China in population by
the year 2025. Despite its size (16% of the global population), India produces just 2%
of the world's electricity.[3] While ranking ninth internationally in gross production,
with an output of over 600 billion kWh, India is far behind every European and North
American country, not to mention nations like Fiji, Zimbabwe, Mongolia, and Azer-
baijan, in per capita electricity production. In 2002, India ranked 137th, producing
a little over 500 kWh per person, far below the United States's approximately 13,000
kWh and Kyrgyzstan's 2,600 kWh per capita. 1
There is an undeniable relationship between per capita GDP and per capita energy
production. Figure 2-1 illustrates this trend, comparing kilowatt hours to the per
capita GDP. Although the data are noisy, with a number of outliers, and causality
is indeterminate, the presence of a correlation is clear. It is relatively unambiguous
that the per capita GDP is proportional to the per capita electricity production.
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Figure 2-1: Per capita GDP estimates plotted against per capita energy production
production estimates from 2002
India is aware of this demand. With a growth rate of 6%, India's GDP is growing
rapidly, but to sustain this improvement, India's electricity industry will have to
grow with it. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Limited, and the Government
of India have estimated that to achieve "moderate levels of economic growth" India
'Per capita values and rankings were calculated using the CIA Factbook 2002 estimates.
needs a production capacity of at least 900 GWe, an order of magnitude increase from
current output levels. [3] In their "Strategy for Growth of Electrical Energy in India"
the Government of India set as its ultimate goal an electricity capacity of 8 trillion
kWh by 20150.[4]
2.2 Limited Traditional Fuels
Approximately 70% of India's energy output is generated through the burning of coal,
and 70% of the coal recovered in India is used for electricity production.[5] However,
in addition to dealing with an urgent need for increased energy production, India is,
for the first time in recent history, encountering widespread coal shortages. Although
these shortages are the result of myriad problems, and appear to be temporary, they
are indicative of a larger problem India will face within the next few decades.[6]
India's Ministry of Coal recently reported that with an estimated growth rate
of 5% per year in coal production, as would be necessary to sustain the growth
in electricity proposed by the Government of India, the country's extractable coal
reserves would be exhausted within 40 years.[7]
Aware that the country will be unable to meet those demands solely through the
use of traditional fuels, the government has turned to alternative sources of energy.
In addition to investing in renewable sources of electricity, including hydro power,
wind power, solar energy, biofuels, geothermal energy, and ocean energy, India has
made nuclear power a top priority since winning its independence in 1947.
2.3 Environmental Concerns
2.3.1 Carbon Emissions
As the number of people concerned about global climate change increases, the focus
turns more and more to carbon-less sources of energy. The 2003 MIT study, "The
Future of Nuclear Power," analyzes the role nuclear power will play in this century in
lowering carbon emissions. For the purposes of the study, a goal of no more than twice
the pre-industrial CO2 concentration is assumed. This value comes from a scientific
consensus that anything greater would cause serious climate alterations. [8]
Given this assumption, the study imagined a global growth scenario in which the
world's nuclear capacity grew to 1000 GWe by 2050. A global deployment scenario
necessary to achieve this threefold increase in nuclear energy was projected in the
study. Figure 2-2, taken from the study, shows the projected development between
2002, when the data were gathered, and 2050. Although the exact kilowatt values
have large associated uncertainties, the regional projections between 2000 and 2050
are striking.
In order for the global capacity to increase to 1000 GWe, which would only increase
nuclear's share of the electricity market from 17% to 19% and would eliminate only
a quarter of the carbon-emission increase between now and 2050, the market share
of nuclear power in the developing world would have to increase from 2% to 11%.[1]
In particular, China, India, and Pakistan would need to increase to on the order of
200 GWe. This study provides evidence to support the assertion that although the
United States will have to lead the way, key to nuclear power's role in reducing carbon
emissions is the wholehearted participation of developing countries like India.[1]
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Figure 2-2: "The Future of Nuclear Power" Global Projection Scenario[l]
2.3.2 Pollution Control
Although it may seem as though India is more likely to focus on the immediate
economic concerns, instead of comparatively intangible concerns or greenhouse gasses
and climate change, there are elements to the environmental concerns that are urgent
for India.
The rapid urbanization of India over the past few years has led to a dramatic
increase in pollution levels. Airborne particulate matter, the primary measure of the
success of pollution controls, has been measured in New Delhi at ten times the legal
limit.[9] Of the global 3 million deaths that are credited to air pollution, the highest
percentage is attributed to India.[9] Although some of the pollution can be ascribed
to urbanization, transportation, and industry, the high number of coal-fired plants
play an undeniable role in the problem.
In addition to domestic pollution concerns, India has been under pressure from
Europe and other developed countries to manage its emissions. Between 1990 and
2001, India's carbon emissions increased by more than 61%, second only to China. [91
Because of its status as a developing country, India was exempt from the requirements
of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, the international community is looking to India
to make some good faith effort to improve conditions.[10]
2.4 The Nuclear Option
In response to the problems outlined above, India has begun an extensive diversifica-
tion process, promoting energy solutions as traditional as coal and as untried as ocean
power. But India has come to the conclusion that nuclear is an essential component
to its economic growth and have made the development of nuclear energy a priority.
Water, wind, and ocean power are certainly clean energy, but still, in the early
stages of development, and prohibitively expensive, they are incapable of providing
the massive scale-up India requires. India's focus on nuclear is in many ways a
compromise: cleaner than coal and more powerful than wind. The rest of this thesis
will address whether nuclear can satisfy India's demands.

Chapter 3
India's Nuclear Program
3.1 Nuclear History
In 1948, India launched its long-term program to develop nuclear power as an energy
alternative by passing the Atomic Energy Act of 1948 and establishing the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC). Six years later, a presidential order created the Depart-
ment of Atomic Energy (DAE), which reported directly to the Prime Minister, and the
Atomic Energy Commission was then relocated to the DAE. This move coincided with
the United States's "Atoms For Peace" initiative, which included a massive campaign
to whet the appetites of developing nations for nuclear energy. The US's predispo-
sition to favor nuclear power advancement in India, coupled with active lobbying by
India's nuclear energy chief, allowed the US to sell India ten tons of heavy water for
its first heavy-water research reactor, CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor US).[11] This
was just the first exchange in nearly two decades of friendly relations between the US
and India, over which time the US supplied India with nuclear technology, material,
and expertise, as well as more than $93 million in grants and loans, easing India's
path to nuclear development. [12]
Despite the substantial help of international allies, India's priority has always been
self-sufficiency. With this in mind, the administration carefully laid the groundwork
for a system capable of sustaining the nuclear program in the absence of outside in-
tervention. In 1962, the legislature updated the Atomic Energy Act, transforming
the Atomic Energy Commission from a small body with a primarily research focus to
a powerful governmental unit responsible for all policy and regulatory decisions con-
cerning nuclear power. The same act gave the DAE full and exclusive responsibility
for the "the theory, design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors" and made
the DAE the enforcer of the policy decisions made by the AEC.[13J
In addition, the Indian government founded a national research center in Trombay,
called the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The facility includes a training
center, which prepares scientists and engineers for careers in nuclear power, an array
of research reactors, a thorium facility, and a number of other installations designed
for the support and study of all stages of the fuel cycle. Aspara, the first research
reactor, both in India and Asia, was installed in 1956, and was followed soon after
by CIRUS and Zerlina in 1960 and 1961 respectively. As the AEC placed a heavy
emphasis on the importance of human resources, the training center became the center
of the nuclear community - all professional nuclear scientists and engineers cite their
Batch number from BARC, indicating their nuclear training group. 1
3.1.1 India's Three-Stage Plan
India has set three stages for the development of nuclear power, with energy auton-
omy as the ultimate goal. The first stage takes advantage of India's domestic supplies
of natural uranium, employing pressurized hard-water reactors (PHWRs) to produce
electricity, with the added bonus of a plutonium fission product. The second stage
will use this plutonium in a number of fast breeder reactors (FBRs), which produce
electricity, along with extra plutonium and U-233, through the development of tho-
rium. The third and final stage of development will include a series of self-sustaining
reactors which use thorium to produce U-233.[14]
In addition to having limited supplies of coal and natural gas, India has just 0.8%
of the world's uranium resources. Although this uranium is sufficient for the first few
rounds of development, relying ad infinitum on natural uranium would require India
'For instance, the AERB Vice-Chairman includes in his Internet bio that he graduated "from
the 12th Batch of BARC Training School"
to depend on the unpredictable global community. In accordance with its focus on
self-reliance, a significant part of India's nuclear progress has been the development of
thorium, a natural resource India has in virtually unlimited supply. Thorium, though
not itself fissile, becomes Th-233 upon absorbing a neutron. It then decays to the
highly fissile U-233, which, with a forty times higher yield, can be used in place of
U-235 to greater effect.
3.1.2 Plan Implementation
In 1965, construction on India's first nuclear power facility commenced. Comprising
two boiling water reactors, Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) went in to op-
eration in 1969. In addition to providing 320 MWe to the surrounding area, TAPS
proved the viability of nuclear power in India and gave the administration some much
needed experience, although it remains the country's only BWR facility and the re-
actor core was provided by the United States.[15] In the meantime, in a venture more
relevant to the country's ultimate goal, construction began on a series of pressurized
heavy water reactors, each with a capacity of 220 MWe. PHWR installations were
constructed. in Kaiga, Kakrapar, Kalpakkam, Narora, and Rawatbhata. Shortly after
Tarapur achieved criticality, the nuclear plan's second stage commenced in earnest.
In 1971, at the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR), the fabrication
of plutonium fuel rods marked the first step towards the completion of India's first
fast breeder test reactor. This FBR, known as PURNIMA-I, achieved criticality a
little more than a year later, in May of 1972.[16]
3.1.3 Smiling Buddha
As a result of constructive efforts on the part of the administration to steer the coun-
try towards energy autonomy, the nuclear industry was relatively prepared when the
United States turned its back on India, cutting off nuclear exports. The impetus
behind the US policy shift was India's 1974 detonation of the "Smiling Buddha,"
their first nuclear explosive device, in Pokhran. Manufactured using plutonium from
the Canadian-Indian joint enterprise CIRUS, the test was a shock to the nation's
North American allies.[17] The Indian government, noting that the test was on In-
dian soil and below ground, classified the event as a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion," a
designation employed on a number of occasions by the US and the USSR. But the in-
ternational community viewed it as a weapons test, and Canada and the United States
immediately reversed their policy of providing financial and technical assistance.[18]
Despite claims by the Indian government at the time that the detonation was entirely
peaceful, the project leader, Raja Ramanna, announced to the press in 1997 that
"The Pokhran test was a bomb, I can tell you now." He then added, "An explosion is
an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground...
I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful." [19]
3.1.4 Public Enterprise
After the Pokhran test, India continued to move forward, albeit more slowly, in its
development of both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, this time in relative isola-
tion. Research, construction, and production continued under the administration of
the DAE. In addition to developing innovative technology, the nuclear community was
looking for a more efficient administrative infrastructure. In 1987, motivated by the
theory that a business could be run more effectively than a government department,
the Government of India founded a public enterprise corporation to take over the job.
The Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Limited (NPCIL), a company controlled
by the DAE, took over the job of producing and distributing electricity through the
generation of nuclear power. The DAE and AEC remained in place as a regulatory
agency, making and.enforcing all the relevant nuclear policies and regulations, but the
NPCIL was introduced as a business, with the operational freedom and investment
opportunities not available to government departments.[20]
As with any public sector enterprise, the question arises as to what extent it is
in the control of the government. In the case of the NPCIL, it is clear that the
interests of the administration are closely mirrored by the policies of the corporation.
Although the NPCIL is independently audited and issues its own corporate bonds to
the public, the Chairman and Managing Director, along with the Board of Directors,
are appointed by the governing party.[21] Typically those appointed to the Board and
chosen as managers have been prepared for their position by a career in the DAE. In
fact, at present, no fewer than seven of the twelve men on the Board of Directors are
simultaneously employed by the NPCIL and a regulatory body of the Government of
India.
3.1.5 Nuclear Weapons Test
Ten years after the commissioning of the NPCIL, India was making great strides in
nuclear technology and was well on its way towards the successful completion of the
first of its three stages. But in 1998, two days after Pakistan performed a highly-
publicized missile test, Prime Minster Vajpayee, who was elected on a platform of
making India an openly declared nuclear weapons state, ordered the detonation of five
nuclear weapons.[22] The development of the Shakti Test devices, as it was known,
employed a team of researchers and engineers from BARC and the Defense Research
and Development Organization. Three devices were detonated on May 11 and two
more two days later: a thermonuclear device; a pure fission missile warhead; and three
experimental fission devices. Each device contained fissile material from BARC's
stage-two research reactors. [23]
Both before and after the detonations India claimed a no-first-use policy, despite
vigorously asserting its right to have first strike capabilities while Pakistan controls
its own nuclear arsenal and refuses to abide by a no-first-use policy.[24] Nevertheless,
these tests :reiterated India's status as somewhat of a pariah in the international nu-
clear community. Under the provisions of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
no state without nuclear weapons at the time was permitted to develop them. India
refused to sign the treaty on the grounds that it includes a baseless discrimination
against those countries that had not developed nuclear weapons by the arbitrary date
of 1968. The administration stated that if there were a provision for universal dis-
armament India. would sign the treaty, but until that time, nuclear weapons were
necessary to protect itself against an aggressive Pakistan.
The reaction to the tests served only to demonstrate India's continued isolation
from the nuclear community. However, the scientists and engineers seemed un-
daunted. In the days after the weapons test, at a press conference, the scientists
who worked on the devices were asked whether they were concerned about the export
sanctions imposed upon them. Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, the Secretary of Depart-
ment of Defense Research and Development, responded "Technologically, we have
faced sanctions for a long time. When we were refused the supercomputer, we went
ahead and made our own. In the space programme, when we were refused cryogenic
engines, we have gone ahead and made our own which should be ready next year. No
one can trouble us technologically. There is a challenge to be met and we rise to the
occasion." [25]
3.2 Current Capacity
In spite of India's relatively limited access to civilian nuclear technology from other
nations, it has been remarkably successful in the development of nuclear power. In
stark contrast to United States nuclear programs, nearly every nuclear power facility
has been constructed ahead of schedule.[26] Today the country has fifteen commer-
cial power plants in operation, thirteen PHWRs and the two TAPS BWRs, for an
operating capacity of 3260 MWe with an average capacity factor of 71% for the fiscal
year 2005-2006.[27]
Until 2005, all the commercial plants were small reactors with an output of under
220 MWe, but in order to meet their electricity goal, India began to construct bigger
plants. In September 2005, India's first mid-sized nuclear power plant went on-line
in Tarapur, with an operating capacity of 540 MWe. Construction on an identical
facility is near completion, and another 540 MWe are anticipated by January 2007.[28]
Table 3.1 shows the capacity and each unit's average capacity factor for the current
fiscal year, 2005-2006, of India's on-line commercial nuclear power plants. A full list
of reactors, including research reactors and decommissioned reactors can be found in
Appendix A.
Commercial Reactor Capacity Capacity Factor
Reactors Type (MWe) (2005-2006)
Tarapur Unit-i BWR 160 94%
Tarapur Unit-2 BWR 160 96%
Tarapur Unit-4 PHWR 540 70%
Rajasthan Unit-i PHWR 100 0%
Rajasthan Unit-2 PHWR 200 80%
Rajasthan Unit-3 PHWR 220 79%
Rajasthan Unit-4 PHWR 220 78%
Madras Unit-i PHWR 170 84%
Madras Unit-2 PHWR 170 80%
Narora Unit-1 PHWR 220 71%
Narora Unit-2 PHWR 220 69%
Kakrapar Unit-i PHWR 220 54%
Kakrapar Unit-2 PHWR 220 68%
Kaiga Unit-i PHWR 220 66%
Kaiga Unit-2 PHWR 220 81%
Total 3260 71%
Table 3.1: India's Commercial Nuclear Power Capacity
3.3 Safety
There have been some concerns about compromising safety for efficiency. Since the in-
ception of the nuclear program, possibly because rapid growth and short construction-
times, there have been a number of accidents at nuclear power facilities. Narora Units
1 and 2 each suffered a fire that brought them down for more than a year, in 1993 and
1996 respectively. In 1994, the containment dome collapsed during the construction
of Kaiga's first unit, delaying its deployment. [29]
In 1996, the IAEA placed all nine of India's operating nuclear power facilities on
its list of the 50 least reliable of the 399 reactors it monitors.[29]
3.4 The Next Wave of Expansion
In 2003, recognizing that the growth of the electricity industry was being outstripped
by the growth of the population, the Ministry of Power issued a brand new National
Electricity Policy.[30] In it were the administration's energy goals:
* Access to Electricity - Available for all households in next five years
* Availability of Power - Demand to be fully met by 2012. Energy and peaking
shortages to be overcome and adequate spinning reserve to be available.
* Supply of Reliable and Quality Power of specified standards in an efficient man-
ner and at reasonable rates.
* Per capita availability of electricity to be increased to over 1000 units by 2012.
* Minimum lifeline consumption of 1 unit/household/day as a merit good by year
2012.
* Financial Turnaround and Commercial Viability of Electricity Sector.
* Protection of consumers' interests.
This optimism has permeated the whole administration. India's Tenth Five Year
Plan was introduced by K.C. Pant, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commis-
sion, with stirring, encouraging rhetoric: "The Tenth Five Year Plan marks the return
of visionary planning to India after a long interregnum of cautious optimism.... It
calls for us to stretch beyond our immediate capabilities and set targets which are in
consonance with our needs and the evident aspirations of our people." [311 With these
goals in mind, India embarked on the biggest commercial nuclear expansion program
in its history.
3.4.1 Stage One Construction
The Government of India, with the consensus of the DAE, AEC, and NPCIL, have
set a target of 20,000 MWe of commercial nuclear capacity by the year 2020, and to
produce 25% of their electricity from nuclear power by 2050. Taking steps towards
that goal, the NPCIL currently has seven PWRs under construction, all scheduled for
commercial operation by December 2008. In addition to four more small PHWRs at
Kaiga and Rajasthan, and the one mid-sized reactor at Tarapur, the NPCIL will also
connect two massive 1000 MWe reactors to the grid in Kudankulam in the next two
years. Water-cooled water-moderated energy reactors (WWERs), first developed by
the Soviet Union in their quest for an energy solution, are pressurized water reactors
that use low enriched uranium dioxide pellets as fuel. The primary difference between
this and the western PWRs are the horizontal steam generators used in the former.[32J
Table 3.2 shows the capacity and expected completion date of the seven facilities under
construction.
With a comprehensive knowledge of PHWRs, such that their construction has
become routine, India has mastered stage one of its three-stage plan.
Under Reactor Capacity Expected
Construction Type (MWe) Completion
Kaiga Unit-3 PHWR 220 Mar 2007
Kaiga Unit-4 PHWR 220 Sep 2007
Rajasthan Unit-5 PHWR 220 Aug 2007
Rajasthan Unit-6 PHWR 220 Feb 2008
Tarapur Unit-3 PHWR 540 Jan 2007
Kudankulam Unit-1 WWER 1000 Dec 2007
Kudankulam Unit-2 WWER 1000 Dec 2008
Total 3420
Table 3.2: India's Commercial Nuclear Power Capacity
3.4.2 Stage Two Construction
In 2003 India moved to the second stage in commercial nuclear power, with the for-
mation of another public sector Government of India enterprise: Bharatiya Nabhikiya
Vidyut Nigam Limited (BHAVINI). BHAVINI, according to its Chairman and Man-
aging Director, has been set up "with the specific mandate of implementing the Fast
Breeder Reactor Programme in a commercially successful manner in our country." [33]
With the prototype designed by researchers at IGCAR, and the management team
staffed almost entirely from within the NPCIL, the new venture is inseparably linked
to the old. In fact, the Chairman and Managing Director of the NPCIL, S.K. Jain,
was appointed to fill the role simultaneously of BHAVINI's first Chairman and Man-
aging Director, and the Board of Directors were appointed to their positions by the
President of India from within the NPCIL and IGCAR.[34]
In August 2003, BHAVINI began excavation in Kalpakkam for the construction
of India's first indigenous fast breeder reactor.[34] With the ability to run on recycled
plutonium and depleted uranium, the plant will demonstrate India's commitment to
the three-stage plan and provide 500 MWe without requiring any natural uranium.
It is expected to become operational in 2010.
3.5 Industry Structure
The relationship between the commercial industry and the research establishment is
relatively streamlined in India, because of the government-owned nature of the nu-
clear enterprise. Everything from design to decommissioning, including construction,
commissioning, and operation, is done by the NPCIL, and literally every aspect of
the electrical output is controlled by some part of the government, including fuel
fabrication, grid maintenance, and waste management.
The first stage is at the Government of India Central Electricity Authority, which
assesses the country's growing electricity needs. A portion of these demands are
meted out to the Department of Atomic Energy, which is responsible for meeting
that demand. Within the DAE, the Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for
directing the construction and operation of the nuclear power plants to meet these
goals. The AEC then directs the NPCIL on where and when to build new commercial
power plants.
3.5.1 Design
By the time a commercial power plant is commissioned, decades of research have been
done on the subject within the DAE and a prototype has been created by IGCAR.
The NPCIL has a design team which tailors the prototype to the geography of the
construction site.
3.5.2 Manufacture and Construction
One direct result of India's insistence on self-reliance is that all the materials nec-
essary for the construction are produced domestically. For the parts that are not
nuclear-specific, generic manufacturers are commissioned to provide the materials.
Although some of the producers of parts such as turbines, steam generators, and cir-
cuits are private companies, the NPCIL is empowered to make whatever alterations
it deems necessary. In the early years of the program, the NPCIL made a number of
such changes to the production facilities to take into account the foreseen demand,
regardless of public or private status.[35] The NPCIL also installs its own quality
control inspectors whenever parts for nuclear purposes are commissioned.[35]
For the nuclear specific materials, including heavy water, control rods, and fuel,
the DAE has created divisions to manufacture the products and meet any and all
needs of the NPCIL. Uranium and thorium analysis is done by the Atomic Minerals
Directorate of Exploration and Research of the DAE and the mining and processing
is then done by the Uranium Corporation of India, Ltd (a public sector company
created along the same lines as the NPCIL). The fuel fabrication process is performed
by the Nuclear Fuel Complex of the DAE, which also assembles the fuel matrices and
manufactures the zirconium alloy sheaths. The heavy water is provided by the Heavy
Water Board of the DAE.
Once the parts are manufactured, the NPCIL employs firms with experience with
fossil fuel plants to construct the actual facility.[35]
3.5.3 Operation
Commercial nuclear power plant operation runs on a hierarchical system based almost
entirely on educational qualifications. The "professionals," engineers who have stud-
ied at BARC and passed the NPCIL's training course, fill the managerial positions.
In addition to the managerial staff, professionals are assigned the more technically de-
manding jobs, and fill the senior-engineer positions, similar to the US senior-engineer
position. These people are almost exclusively graduates of India's elite institutions,
such as the India Institute of Technology, and have engineering Masters degrees and
PhDs in a variety of disciplines, including metallurgy, electrical engineering, bio-
sciences, and mechanical engineering.[36]
In the middle are the "semi-professionals." Having earned degrees in engineering
or advanced trade degrees, these men are employed as supervisors, directing the
day-to-day activities in the different departments, acting, frequently, as the liaison
between the managers and the technicians. The technicians, as their name implies
deal with the daily manual labor. Generally technicians are those without advanced
degrees, and have earned only their high school diploma or a trade certification.[20]
Within the power plant, the staff is divided further. In many ways similar to the
American system, each nuclear power plant has several teams dealing with different
aspects of the plant performance: Operation, Maintenance, Technical, and Training
divisions. Within each group is a hierarchy of managers, engineers, supervisors, and
technicians.
3.6 Regulatory Structure
In 1948, when the Atomic Energy Commission was created, research into the imple-
mentation of nuclear power protocols was in its infancy. Today, with the commercial
success of stage one and the commencement of the commercial life of stage two, a
much more complicated regulatory regime is necessary, particularly as the operational
scope of India's nuclear program is under the control of the government.
Figure 3-1 provides an outline of the organizational structure of the Department
of Atomic Energy. Although the AEC directs the activities of the DAE, it remains
a part of the larger department. In addition to the public sector enterprises, such as
the NPCIL and BHAVINI, and the research and development organizations, including
BARC and IGCAR, the DAE is responsible for a number of industrial organizations,
support organizations, and institutions for education.
The process for constructing a new nuclear power plant extends beyond the DAE.
The first step is an analysis by the Central Electricity Authority on the specific
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program, and then delegates the implementation to the DAE.[39] The NPCIL, in its
prototype to a site-specific model. They then write up an application and submit it for
examination and approval to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), which
is responsible for approving all the country's nuclear facilities.
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When Indiga's first commercial nuclear power plant was commissioned in 19t5, the
government of India recognized the need for an oversight committee, an indepen-
the commissioning of the Tarapur station. Three years later, when the Rajasthan
Atomic Powaer Station was launched, a second body was created to authorize and
monitor its safety status. Eventually the two committees were consolidated to form
the DAE Safety Review Committee (SRC)i which was responsible for the general
safety oversight of all aspects of the DAE.[40]
In 1980, a committee assigned to make a recommendation on the advantages and
disadvantages of the SRC issued a report called the "Reorganization of Regulatory
and Safety Functions" which recommended the formation of the AERB with "powers
to lay down safety standards and assist DAE in framing rules and regulations for
enforcing regulatory and safety requirements envisaged under the Atomic Energy Act
1962." [40]
The Board was created within three years of the report and immediately took on
the oversight of the DAE, including the authorization of new power plants proposed
by the NPCIL as well as the enforcement of safety protocols on facilities outside the
DAE.
Over time, the scope of the committee has grown dramatically. With the rise of
the use of nuclear technology in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and transporta-
tion, the specialization of the AERB has increased in proportion. Figure 3-2 shows
the organizational structure of the AERB, giving an idea of the size of the Board.
However, their mission has never changed; it remains"To ensure that the presence of
ionizing radiation and the use of nuclear energy in India do not cause unacceptable
impact on the health of workers, members of the public, and the environment." [40]
3.7 The Licensing Process
Over the years, despite its expanding scope and objectives, the AERB's primary role
has been as the licensor of commercial nuclear power plants. Each nuclear power
plant must be approved by the AERB at every step in the process: site approval,
construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning.
3.7.1 Process Overview
In the first step of the licensing process, the utility crafts a comprehensive application
for the proposed facility. This requires a complete design and prototype, along with
an assessment of every conceivable safety factor. Once each risk has been considered
and quantified, the application is submitted to the AERB Secretariat.
Figure 3-2: The organizational structure of India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board[40]
The Secretariat then passes it on to the relevant Design Safety Committee, which
works with the utility to evaluate the application. In addition to passing its recom-
mendation along to the Secretariat and the advisory committees, the Design Safety
Committees work alongside the utility to improve the application, telling them what
information and supplemental material must be submitted along with the applica-
tion. The application must include everything relevant to the extensive regulations
enacted by the AEC and the AERB. With the Design Safety Committee as its first
stop, no application makes its way to the advisory committee incomplete. [40]
Once the utility has provided enough information to satisfy the Design Safety
Committee, they send it back to the Secretariat, who farms it out to the relevant ad-
visory committee which reviews the application. The advisory committee, supported
by smaller safety committees, gives a recommendation to the Board. The Board then
reviews the application once more, and either rejects or denies the application, based
primarily on the advice of the advisory committee.
3.7.2 The Committees, Divisions, and Task Forces
This blithe summation of the work flow drastically over-simplifies the process; there
are more than 68 committees in the AERB taken from all across the country. The un-
derlying philosophy is that more steps in the process correlates to a lower probability
that mistakes make it all the way through. The committees range from overarchingly
broad to intriguingly specific, including the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
alongside the Glossary Review Committee and the "Committee for selection of can-
didates for admission to M.Tech." A full list of AERB committees can be found in
Appendix B.
Although the summary in Section 3.7.1 is accurate, it by no means gives an idea of
the sheer number of people a given application is seen by. However, there is a method
to the madness. When a nuclear power plant is commissioned, each step of the process
and every detail of each step is examined minutely by the appropriate committee,
which is composed of the foremost experts India has to offer on the subject.
Advisory Committees for Project Safety Review
The AERB is supported by three under-committees: the Safety Review Committee
for Operating Plants (SARCOP), which carries out surveillance and periodic reviews
of the nuclear power plants; Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation
(SARCAR), which manages all applications of nuclear materials not related to nuclear
power, such as radiation therapy and medical imaging; and, key to the licensing
process, the Advisory Committees for Project Safety Review (ACPSRs).
There exists an ACPSR for every type of nuclear power project, including the
Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review of Light Water Reactor Projects
(ACPSR-LWR), the Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review of New Radioac-
tive Waste Management Plants/Facilities, and the Advisory Committee for Project
Safety Review of PHWR-based NPPs and PFBRs (ACPSR-PHWR/PFBR). These
advisory committees review the application with the support of the subsidiary com-
mittees devoted to the minutia.[41]
3.7.3 The Steps
Rather than issuing a single license for the design and construction of a nuclear
power plant, the AERB separately authorizes each step in the process, including site
approval, construction, commissioning, operation, and decommissioning.
Site Approval
When a site has been proposed by the NPCIL, it must be approved before the next
step of the process can commence. The ACPSR-PHWR/PFBR collects reports from
the Site Evaluation Committee and site evaluation documents from the NPCIL. It
examines the reports and studies the appropriateness of the site for a nuclear power
plant, with respect to the safety of the surrounding population as well as the plant
itself. It also evaluates any site-specific requirements the plant administrators are
likely to encounter in the construction and operation stages. [42]
The recommendations are then forwarded to the AERB along with suggestions
and requirements. The AERB typically follows the recommendation of the ACPSR,
and if they give the site a positive review, the AERB is likely to give the project site
clearance. [40]
Commissioning and Construction
The ACPSR also handles the construction and commissioning authorization. Taking
into account evaluations from the Project Design Safety Committee and the Civil
Engineering Safety Committee, the ACPSR assembles a report for the AERB with a
complete recommendation, including "observations/suggestions/stipulations." [41]
The ACPSR generally takes into account the management structure, the staff
qualifications, the caliber of the subcontractors, the quality control program, and the
emergency preparedness of the project. These factors are evaluated on the basis of
recommendations and reports from an assortment of committees.2
The ACPSR then makes its recommendation to the AERB, which will give the
NPCIL authorization for commissioning or construction.
Operation
When a plant is finally constructed, before it can go operational, there is a joint review
by ACPSR and the Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP). For
the ACPSR, the process is nearly identical to the process for commissioning and
construction: sub-committees are assigned to evaluate the details and the ACPSR
makes recommendations concerning the safety of the plant.
The joint review is used for the plant's first two milestones: the first approach to
criticality and the first time the capacity factor reaches 100%. All following reviews
are handled exclusively by SARCOP, so the joint review is essential in this transition
period. [42]
Decommissioning
Decommissioning for the most part follows the same process as commissioning, with
safety evaluations, sub-committees, and reports to the AERB. Authorization by the
AERB is required before any power station can be decommissioned. However, because
decommissioning frequently involves the transportation of radioactive material, the
Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation (SARCAR) is involved.
Drawing on the advice of other more specialized committees, SARCAR is re-
sponsible for authorizing transportation methods for radioactive material as well as
waste-management facilities. It makes a recommendation to the AERB, which grants
or denies authorization on the basis of SARCAR's report.
2For example, an evaluation of the control room computers would be done by the Standing
Committee for Control, Instrumentation and Computer Based Systems
3.8 Pros and Cons of the Licensing Process
3.8.1 Autonomy
The primary advantage of this system is the autonomy of the licensing board. In-
dependence is essential for any regulatory body, as the regulators should have no
personal stake in whatever they authorize.
In recognition of this principle, the AERB's first chairman was Professor A.K. De,
the former director of the India Institute of Technology, a man previously unaffili-
ated with the DAE.[43] Today, the AERB protects that reputation careful. Except
by virtue of having studied and worked extensively at BARC or IGCAR, not one
of the division directors of the AERB worked for the DAE before coming to the
AERB, a difficult assertion to make, since the DAE runs virtually the entire nu-
clear community. [43] That executive board and final decision-makers are independent
arbiters makes them more attune to biases in the information.
On the other hand, the AERB does receive extensive advice from the Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Safety, which is staffed by experts from the DAE, in addition
to scientists and engineers from the AERB and other independent agencies. And, as
Section 3.7.2 should have made clear, the sheer volume of material that is authorized
by the AERB is staggering. The board-members may be chosen because of their
status as independent arbiters, but most of the recommendations on which they base
their decisions come from engineers in the thick of it. [40]
Upon his retirement in 1996, A. Gopalakrishnan, the outgoing chairman of the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, stated that safety at the nuclear power plants had
been compromised because of the AERB's subsidiary status to the department it is
supposed to be regulating, the DAE. He revealed that more than 130 accidents had
taken place at Indian nuclear facilities, placing it only above Pakistan and Brazil
in terms of safety. However, the DAE responded that Gopalakrishnan was simply
retaliating because his stint as chairman had not been renewed.[29j Not only that,
but since 1996 India has not seen an accident at any of its facilities that resulted in
an outage.
Additionally, the training structure of India's nuclear community is such that the
Board can never be truly independent. With every professional engineer in India
making its way through the BARC training facility, there is a distinctly parochial,
insular feel to the industry, and there are few true outsiders.
3.8.2 Multi-Pronged Approach
A committee is less likely to overturn its own decision than an outside agency. Having
both SARCOP and the ACPSR review every project before it achieves criticality is
a sound administrative choice, involving a system of checks and balances, improving
the chances of catching a mistake.
On the other hand, SARCOP works with the ACPSR, receiving copies of their rec-
ommendations and basing many of their conclusions on identical committee reports.
A truly ideal system would have these two authorizations conducted in parallel rather
than in concert, in order to achieve genuine system checks.
3.8.3 Experts and Redundancy
The AERB takes for granted the assumption that the more experts on staff, the
better, and it always strives to get the foremost experts in every field to serve on the
committee. There is no doubt that in some sense this is ideal: it seems trivial to
assume that there is an advantage to always having the best.
However, there is an innate disadvantage therein. In a relatively small nuclear
community, like India's, the subject expert is likely to have been the one to design
the system in the first place. It seems like a good idea to have the man who worked
on the FBR prototype at IGCAR on the FBR committee, but if there is a problem
in the design, he is the least likely to catch it.
Yet the AERB seems to have effectively dealt with that problem. For example,
the Standing Committee for Control, Instrumentation and Computer Based Systems,
comprises ten members: two from BARC's electronics division; two from BARC's
software section; two from IGCAR; two from the NPCIL; one from CIRUS; and
one from the Operating Plant Safety Division of the AERB. On any given project
evaluation. some form of expert bias might arise. However, because of the distribution
of experts, it is unlikely that a majority of the committee would share the same biases.
Again, the system has a buil-in system of checks.
The AERB works under the assumption that redundancy is something to strive
for. Part of their stated philosophy is that the extra levels and seemingly infinite
committees "provide the necessary Independence, Redundancy, and Defence in depth
characteristics." [44]

Chapter 4
US-India Nuclear Policy
4.1 Cooperation
In the early days of atomic energy, the United States's primary strategy in controlling
the flow of nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons was secrecy.
Unwilling to share technology or expertise with even its closest allies, the US main-
tained a policy of staunch nuclear isolationism for over a decade. [45]
In 1953 a new philosophy changed this policy permanently: the belief that nuclear
energy and plentiful electricity were the key to a peaceful coexistence. The "Atoms
for Peace" policy, discussed in Section 3.1, was proposed in December of 1953 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In addition to proposing the formation of an International Atomic Energy Agency,
he outlined a policy that included a voluntary decrease in global nuclear-weapon
stockpiles, *with the fissionable material being collected by the IAEA. The material
would then be used to "provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas
of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength
to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind." [46] The changing policy was
reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which governs US nuclear exports.
President Eisenhower also expressed a particular desire promote peaceful uses of
atomic energy in East-Asia, "a major battleground in the Cold War." [47] In a period
before "rogue states" and international terrorism, this optimistic view of nuclear en-
ergy and its potential seemed entirely reasonable; the only nuclear power of concern
was the Soviet Union. To combat this perceived threat and to encourage economic co-
operation, the United States began a period of close alliance with India that continued
for nearly twenty years.
The US went much farther than simply selling materials to India. It was actually
responsible for the construction of the Tarapur boiling water reactors in 1963. Addi-
tionally, Indian engineers were sent to the United States for training at US nuclear
laboratories. [45]
4.2 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
In January 1968, after three years of wrangling over the language and debating
the necessary terms, the United States and the Soviet Union released a joint draft
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and submitted it to the Eighteen-
Nation Conference on Disarmament (ENCD). Three months later, after further revi-
sions, another draft was submitted to the 22 Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.[48] On July 1, 1968, the NPT was signed by 62 countries. In addition
to three acknowledged nuclear-weapon states, the USSR, the US, and the UK, 59
other countries without nuclear weapons signed the treaty, in the hope that acquies-
cence would assure their protection under the nuclear umbrella of the nuclear-weapon
states.
4.2.1 Provisions of the Treaty
The NPT allowed the five states that were already in possession of nuclear weapons
(the USSR, the US, the UK, France, and China - dubbed "nuclear-weapon states"
(NWS)) to maintain their nuclear arsenal. The conditions on maintenance were that
these five states would refrain from disseminating "nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices." They also were banned from using nuclear weapons on a non-
NWS, unless the non-NWS attacked using a nuclear weapon, or the non-NWS had
launched a conventional attack and was allied with an NWS.[49]
The treaty included no provisions for disarmament, although it encouraged the
nuclear-weapon states to make an effort towards disarmament.
For non-nuclear-weapon states, the treaty was more onerous. In addition to agree-
ing not to develop nuclear weapons, the non-NWS was required to allow IAEA safe-
guards on all civilian nuclear facilities. The safeguards, designed to detect the diver-
sion of nuclear materials from energy facilities for military purposes, use surveillance
and accounting methods to look for discrepancies. [49]
Despite the difficulties assumed in signing the treaty, there were a number of
incentives for non-nuclear-weapon states to do so: they had a written guarantee that
they would not be on the receiving end of a nuclear assault unless they were the
aggressor state; they were supplied with plentiful fissile material for peaceful uses;
and they were allying themselves with the world's most powerful nations. Most
importantly, they risked a falling-out with their international allies if they refused to
sign.
4.3 The Falling-Out
The NPT was the first crack in the previously-amicable US-India relationship. Over
the course of the NPT negotiations, India had insisted that as written the NPT
was discriminatory, imposing an undeserved double-standard. The nuclear-weapon
states had no better qualifications for being entrusted with nuclear weapons aside
from having made them first. India was also perturbed by the absence of enforceable
demands for disarmament written into the treaty. India's third complaint was that
the safeguards, which required allowing inspectors into its facilities with relative fre-
quency, jeopardized their national sovereignty and put the country at the mercy of
inspectors. [49]
India's refusal to sign the treaty put considerable strain on the US's cooperative
alliance with India. But what really brought it to an end was India's 1974 detonation
of the Pokhran test, described in Section 3.1.3. Despite the Indian government's
claim that the test was entirely peaceful, the test illustrated the main problem with
the Atoms for Peace program: that technology intended for peaceful purposes could
ultimately be employed otherwise. The fissile material used in the device had been
produced using American expertise and technology. [17]
The United States's reaction was dramatic. Although it took four years to turn
sentiment in to law, the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act was a direct response to
the Pokhran test.
4.3.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), which amended the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, includes a Statement of Policy asserting that "the proliferation of nuclear
explosive devices or of the direct capability to manufacture or otherwise acquire such
devices poses a grave threat to the security interests of the United States and to
continue international progress toward world peace and development." [50]
It then adds, in a statement that might as well have had India's name on it,
that "recent events emphasize the urgency of this threat and the imperative need
to increase effectiveness of international safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear
activities to prevent proliferation." [50]
The Act, despite reaffirming the US commitment to provide an "adequate nuclear
fuel supply" to countries that planned to use the fuel for peaceful purposes, effectively
ended the United States's cooperative relationship with India. It required any country
receiving the material to allow full-scope safeguards and denied nuclear exports to any
country that attempted to build, acquire, or detonate a nuclear explosive device.[50]
Although the Act was signed in 1978, its full effect was not felt until 1980. Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter allowed two more shipments of nuclear fuel to be sent to India.
Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would not authorize an export license,
on the grounds that it violated the NPT and the NNPA, Carter circumvented the
regulations by exporting them by executive order.[51]
However, by 1980, India felt the full consequences of its Pokhran test. The United
States did not export any more nuclear material after 1980.
4.3.2 The Nuclear Suppliers Group
In addition to changing domestic policy to address its concerns with India's nuclear
weapons program, the United States began to change international policy as well. In
1975, the year after the Pokhran test, the United States formed the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), a coalition of nuclear exporters intent on slowing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, in direct response to India's test.
First meeting in 1975 in London (earning it the nickname "The London Club"),
the NSG initially comprised the seven biggest suppliers of dual-use nuclear material:
Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the USSR, the UK, and the US. Their stated
aim was to "ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to
the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices which would
not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field." [52]
The Pokhran test had demonstrated that there is a surfeit of nuclear materials
that can seem benign when exported but can be diverted or transformed for military
purposes. Additionally, there are materials that can aid in the construction of nuclear
facilities, but have dual-uses, such as lasers, software, or "Zirconium with a hafnium
content of less than 1 part hafnium to 500 parts zirconium by weight, as follows: metal,
alloys containing more than 50% zirconium by weight, compounds, manufactures
thereof, waste or scrap of any of the foregoing." [53]
The policies of the NSG are simple: the participating countries, along with the
IAEA, compile a "trigger list" of parts and materials that can only be exported to
a non-nuclear-weapon state if IAEA safeguards are implemented on the recipient
facility. [52j
4.3.3 The International Reaction
By and large, the international community followed the US lead in their treatment of
India. Although both France and Russia sold uranium to India in the days after the
NNPA, neither has exported nuclear technology to India in the past decade. The two
WWER under construction in India today were originally purchased from Russia, but
since the weapons tests in 1998, India has had no success in acquiring more reactors
from Russia.
4.4 Today
In February of 2006, President George W. Bush visited India and Prime Minister
Dr. Manmohan Singh. While there, he was able to hammer out an agreement for
a new cooperative nuclear relationship between the two countries. After 26 years of
technological isolation, the United States and India reached a historic agreement that
will re-open the avenues of trade and exchange of expertise.
In what is a major compromise on the part of the Government of India, the ad-
ministration agreed to comply with NSG policies, and open its non-military facilities
for IAEA inspections. It will also have to cease all nuclear weapons testing for the du-
ration of the agreement, and must work towards negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty.
In return, the United States will once again export nuclear materials to India.
Although the remaining details of the plan have yet to be negotiated, private enter-
prises are already clamoring for the chance to invest in India's nuclear power program.
However, the proposition has not yet passed the US Congress. In order for it to oc-
cur, Congress needs to amend the NNPA, which bans the sale of nuclear material to
countries that have not signed the NPT.
Although this change will relieve India's recent nuclear fuel shortages, it will also
undermine the energy autonomy that has been the single-minded focus of its nuclear
program since its inception. Some Indian researchers have expressed distaste with the
deal, saying that it undercuts India's third stage, by giving them access to centrifuge
technology and natural uranium.
Another concern is the need to separate India's military and civilian nuclear facil-
ities; because of the public nature of India's power production industry, the militiary
facilities are virtually inseperable from the civilian research facilities.
Padmanabha Krishnagopala Iyengar, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and one of India's top researchers, noted that "Nobody works full time in
our weapons programme. The moment we compartmentalize, our research and devel-
opment will be crippled and creativity will end." [54] However, many of the younger
researchers see the isolation as something that was forced upon them, rather than an
attribute to take pride in, and look forward to the end of export sanctions.
This deal recognizes India's excellent record of non-proliferation, despite its re-
fusal to sign the NPT, and it could be an opportunity for unprecedented levels of
cooperation between the United States and India. This agreement sends a message
to the rest of the world that the US perceives India as a responsible partner in nu-
clear technology. Even if Congress does not amend the NNPA, India could see a lot
of doors opening up in the near future.

AIndia's Fleet of Nuclear Reactors
Capacity
1
40
100
100
100
Type
PWR
PHWR
PHWR
FBR
FBR
Reactor
Supplier
UK
Canada
BARC
DAE
DAE
Percent
Complete
100
100
100
100
100
Date of
Operation
1956
1960
1969
1997
1989
Table A.1: Research Reactors in Operation
Station
Name
Kaiga 1
Kaiga 2
Kakrapar 1
Kakrapar 2
Kalpakkam
Kalpakkam
Rajasthan 1
Rajasthan 2
Rajasthan
Raj asthan
Narora 1
Narora 2
Tarapur 1
Tarapur 2
Tarapur 4
Date of
Operation
2000
2000
1993
1995
1984
1986
1973
1981
2000
2000
1991
1992
1969
1969
2005
Table A.2: Commercial Reactors in Operation
Appendix
Station
Name
Apsara
Cirus
]Dhruva
FBTR
Kamini
Capacity
220
220
220
220
170
220
100
200
220
220
220
220
160
160
540
Type
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
PHWR
BWR
BWR
PHWR
Reactor
Supplier
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
AECL
AECL
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
NPCIL
GE
GE
NPCIL
Percent
Complete
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Station Reactor Percent Date of
Name Capacity Type Supplier Complete Operation
Kaiga 3 220 PHWR NPCIL 84 2007
Kaiga 4 220 PHWR NPCIL 66 2007
Rajasthan 5 220 PWHR NPCIL 77 2007
Rajasthan 6 220 PWHR NPCIL 58 2008
Kudankulam 1 1000 WWER Russia 65 2007
Kadunkulam 2 1000 WWER Russia 60 2008
Tarapur 3 540 PHWR NPCIL 70 2007
Prototype FBR 500 FBR BHAVINI 17 2010
Table A.3: Commercial Reactors under Construction
Appendix B
Advisory Committees of the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
1. ACCGASSO Advisory Committee for Codes, Guides & Associated Manuals for
Safety in Operation of NPPs
2. ACCGD Advisory Committee on Code, Guides & Associated Manuals for Safety
in Design of NPPs
3. ACCGORN Advisory Committee for preparation of Code & Guides on Govern-
mental Organization for the Regulation of Nuclear & Radiation facilities
4. ACCGQA Advisory Committee for Codes & Guides for Quality Assurance for
Nuclear Power Plants Safety
5. ACIFS Advisory Committee on Industrail and Fire Safety
6. ACNS Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
7. ACOH Advisory Committee on Occupational Health
8. ACPSR-FCF Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review of Fuel Cycle Fa-
cilities
9. ACPSR-LWR Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review of Light Water
Reactor Projects
10. ACPSR-PHWR/PFBR Advisory Committee for Project Safety Review of PH-
WRs/PFBR
11. ACRDCSE Advisory Committee for Regulatory Documents on Civil and Struc-
tural Engineering
12. ACRDS Advisory Committee for Regulatory Documents on Nuclear Power
Plant Siting
13. ACRS Advisory Committee on Radiological Safety
14. AC-SD-FCF Advisory Committee on Safety Documents relating to Fuel Cycle
Facilities other than Nuclear Reactors
15. AERB-Canteen AERB Canteen Committee
16. AERB-Infrastructure AERB Infrastructure Committee
17. AERB-Library AERB Library Committee
18. AERB-Space AERB Space Committee
19. CESC Civil Engineering Safety Committee (for nuclear power projects)
20. CESCOP Civil Engineering Safety Committee for Operating Plants
21. CESCOP-ITF Task Force to assist CESCOP in Inspection Activities
22. CPSA-Nuc Committee on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear
Facilities
23. CRAASDRW Committee to Review Application for Authorisation of Safe Dis-
posal of Radioactive Waste
24. CRMM-BSM Committee to Examine the Radiological Issues Involved in Mining
and Milling of Beach Sands Minerals
25. CSECURITY Committee on Security
26. CSGA Committee to prepare a Safety Guide on Accelerators
27. CSRIP Committee on Safety Research Programmes
28. ECSQ Expert Committee for Seismic Qualification of Existing DAE's Installa-
tions
29. EXECC AERB Executive Committee
30. FAAC Fatal Accident Assessment Committee
31. GRC Glossary Review Committee
32. LC-FBTR&Kamini Licensing Committee for FBTR and Kamini
33. LC-HWP Licensing Committee for HWPs
34. LC-NPS Licensing Committee for the Nuclear Power Stations
35. OIC-NONDAE Over Exposure Investigation Committee to Review Overexpo-
sure in Non-DAE Installation
36. PDSC-IFSB-PFBR New Project Design Safety Committee for Interim Fuel
Storage Building for Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
37. PDSC-KAIGA-3&4/RAPP-5&6 Project Design Safety Committee for Kaiga
Atomic Power Project-3&4 and RAPP-5&6
38. PDSC-PFBR Project Design Safety Committee for Prototype Fast Breeder Re-
actor
39. PDSC-TAPP3&4 Project Design Safety Committee for TAPP-3&4
40. PPRC-SRI Project Progress Review Committee for Safety Research Institute
41. Purchase AERB Purchase Committee
42. QMP-NPPs Committee for Qualifying Management Personnel at NPPs
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43. RDRC Radioactive Waste Disposal Review Committee
44. SACNUM Safety Committee for Nuclear Medicine Facilities
45. SARCAR Safety Review Committee for Applications of Radiation
46. SARCOP Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants
47. SC-C&I-CBS Standing Committee for Control & Instrumentation
48. SC-ECIL Safety Committee for ECIL
49. SC-HWP Heavy Water Plants - Safety Committee
50. SC-IGCAR Safety Committee for IGCAR
51. SC-IRE Safety Committee for Indian Rare Earths Ltd.
52. SC-KAIGA/RAPS3&4 Safety Committee for Kaiga - RAPS 3&4
53. SC-MIRA Safety Committee for Medical, Industrial and Research Accelerators
54. SC-NAPS/KAPS Safety Committee for Narora and Kakrapar Atomic Power
Stations
55. SC-NFC Safety Committee for Nuclear Fuel Complex
56. SCOGRAPP Safety Committee on Gamma Irradiation Processing Plants
57. SC-RAPS/MAPS Safety Committee for Rajasthan and Madras Atomic Power
Stations
58. SC-RPLLCL Safety Committee for Radiopharmaceutical Laboratory and La-
belled Compound Facilities of BRIT
59. SC-RSD Standing Committee for Review and revision of AERB's Radiation
Safety Documents
60. SC-TAPS Safety Committee for Tarapur Atomic Power Station
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61. SC-UCIL Safety Committee for Uranium Corporation of India Ltd.
62. SCURF Standing Committee for Investigation of Unusual Occurrences in Ra-
diation Facilities
63. SELECTIONC Committee for selection of candidates for admission to M.Tech.
64. SER-FRFCF Site Evaluation Committee for Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility
65. SRI Council Safety Research Institute Council
66. SRI SC Safety Research Institute Scientific Committee
67. TGRDFI Task Group for Review of Dosimetry for Food Irradiation
68. VRSC VECC-RRCAT Unit Safety Committee
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